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A STRIKING PARALLEL: 
US TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND U.S. POLICY 
IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 
by Ann Seidman~ 
I 
I. INTRODUCTION: A STRIKING PARALLEL 
Widely separated by geographical space, history and culture, 
the Caribbean Basin and Southern Africa nevertheless exh i bit 
several remarkably similar characteristics: Especially since 
world War II, much the same U.S. transnational corporations have 
expanded their investments, contributing to similar patterns of 
distorted growth. The peoples have organized to demand 
fundamental change to end poverty and oppression. In response, 
the United States government has formulated parallel policies, 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative and Constructive Engagement, 
premised on the refurbished cold war myth that the issue is, not 
the right of the peoples to shape their own lives,, but ''U.S. 
1. With many thanks to Brien Dunbar for his work on background 
research for this article. 
2. The parallel features of the U.S. policies in both regions 
include: 1) Efforts to induce governments to create 'hospitable 
investment climates' to for U.S. corporate investment and trade; 
2) fairly recent support for regional common markets within which 
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inter-ests" in an e>:tensi on of the East-West conf 1 i co/-
This ar-ticle fir-st outlines a ser-ies of pr-opositions to 
explain this seeming r-emar-kable similar-ity. It then outlines 
some of the suppor-ting evidence. 
II. THE PROPOSED EXPLANATION: 
To explain the par-allels in the two r-egions r-equir-es several 
interlinked pr-opositions which analyze the changing r-ole of U.S. 
tr-ansnational cor-por-ate investments in both r-egions as they 
r-eflect and foster- changes in the inter-national division of 
labor-; their- consequences for- the lives of the r-egions· 
inhabitants; and how they influence U.S. policy for-mulation. 
U.S. manufactur-ing fir-ms with local affiliates can sell their-
produce; 3) pr-essur-e on author-itar-ian r-egimes for- 'compr-omise' 
r-eforms which will not thr-eaten under-lying political economic 
str-uctur-es; 4) suppor-t to national business gr-oups that will back 
these kinds of r-efor-ms; 5) collabor-ation with affiliates of the 
U.S. AFL-CIO <The Amer-ican Institute for- Fr-ee labour- Development, 
AIFLD, in Latin Amer-ica; and the Afr-ican-Amer-ican Labour- Centr-e 
in Afr-ica, both with known CIA linkages <see D. Thomson and R. 
Larson, Wher-e Wer-e You Br-other-? London: War- on Want, 1978)) to 
identify and tr-ain tr-ade union leader-ship to shun movements 
calling for- political change; 6) selection and tr-aining of 
students in U.S. univer-sities; and 7) cover-t or- over-t suppor-t for-
'contr-as' seeking to undemine br-oadly-suppor-ted gover-nments 
attempting to fundamentally alter- the political economic 
str-uctur-es to meet the peoples' basic needs (See Jenny Pear-ce, 
Under- the Eagle - U.S. Inter-vention in Centr-al Amer-ica and the 
Car-ibbean, <Boston: South End Pr-ess, 1981>; Tom Bar-r-y, Beth Wood, 
and Deb Pr-eussch, The Other- Side of Par-adise - For-eign Contr-ol in 
the Car-ibbean <Albuquer-que,NM: the Resour-ce Center-, 1984>; and 
Ann Seidman, The Roots of Cr-isis in Souther-n Afr-ica <Tr-enton, NJ: 
Africa Wor-ld Pr-ess, 1985>>. 
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A. The post World War II revolution in techology altered the 
conditions of transnational corporate investment. This led to 
changes in the intdrnational division of labor with important 
implications for the peoples of the developed and developing 
countries: 
1. New technologies require more capital-intensive 
mining and infrastructural projects. Their economies 
of scale require vast new investments. This created 
new opportunities for interlinked US transnationals 
which, during World War II, had accumulated vast sums 
of capital. 
2. Advanced communications and transport facilities 
enable U.S. transnational firms to transfer 
labor-intensive factory production to third world 
regions. There, they maximize profits by hiring 
members of historically-created reserves of unemployed 
workers at wages a fraction of those they paid their 
employees at home. In a real sense, the transnationals 
thus put the wages and living standards of U.S. workers 
in the developed countries in competition with low paid 
labor reserves created by underdevelopment and poverty 
in the third world. 
3. The new technologies plus the growing threat to 
foreign capital posed by nationalist movements combine 
to stimulate a shift in transnational corporate 
investment strategy. Instead of acquiring their own 
plantations and mines, they exercise control over 
technology, management, marketing and finance. They 
welcome local private or government participation <or 
even outright ownership> and financing of productive 
mineral and agricultural projects. This reduce the 
danger of nationalization and enable the corporate 
managers to shop around among competing third world 
countries for the lowest cost labor and cheapest raw 
materials, leaving local <sometimes private, sometimes 
government > capital to bear the risks. 
4. Shifting their overseas operations into the 
Eurocurrency market outside the control of Federal 
Reserve Bank, U.S. transnational banks play an 
increasingly important role in facilitating the 
changing international division of labor. They cement 
ties between the relatively small group of U.S. firms 
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3. Kwame Nkrumah, Neocolonialism, 
Imperialism <London: Heinemann, 1965>. 
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the Highest Stage of 
, 
c. 
b. Likewise, as British and Portuguese colonial rule 
ended in southern Africa, US transnationals multiplied 
their investments there. However, to gain access to 
the much greater mineral and agricultural wealth, as 
well as the markets, of the rest of the region, they 
focused on South Africa as a regional subcenter. 
In both the Caribbean Basin and southern Africa, U.S. 
investments perpetuate and accentuate the inherited distorted 
growth pattern that impoverish the mass of the people: 
1. In conjunction with local capital, U.S. 
investments expand enclaves geared to selling a few raw 
materials produced by low-paid labor to uncertain world 
markets; importing manufactured goods, now including 
machinery, equipment and intermediate materials for new 
import-substitution and export-oriented industries; and 
remitting abroad a major share of the resulting 
locally-generated investable surplus. 
2. Increasingly capital intensive agriculture and 
industries pushed more and more men and women into 
unemployed labor reserves, the source of workers whose 
low pay generated high rates of profit. 
D. In the late 1970s and early '80s, international economic and 
financial crises impacted heavily on all third world economies 
including those in the Caribbean and southern Africa. This 
intensified the conditions leading to heightened popular 
struggles for structural changes. 
1. The post World War II pattern of development of 
the small economies like those of the Caribbean Basin 
and southern Africa left them exceptionally vulnerable 
to international crises. 
2. Facing worsening terms of trade and increased 
- 5 -
external debts, national governments in both regions 
introduced austerity measures that imposed the burden 
of the crises on the poor. 
a. In the 1980s, the International Monetary Fund 
<IMF> assumed the role of an international financial 
policeman, reducing transnational banks' risks by 
insisting, as the price for further assistance, that 
national governments pursue 'austerity policies' to 
repay their loans. 
3. Mounting popular discontent led to heightened 
mobilization of third world peoples like those in the 
Caribbean and southern Africa, who demand fundamental 
structural changes to achieve development capable of 
providing increased productive employment opportunities 
and rising living standards. 
E. U.S. policies in both regions reflect pressures 
exerted by interlinked transnational finance capitalist 
interests. 
1. Top U.S. transnational corporate personnel 
maintain innumerable links with U.S. government 
agencies, and devise various channels to influence U.S. 
policy favorable to their interests. 
2. In both regions, refurbishing an ideology that has 
acqsuired a life of its own, US corporate and 
government spokespersons increasingly characterize 
popular third world pressures for fundamental change as 
the result, not of peoples' desires for better lives, 
but foreign 'communist' penetration. 
a. While differing as to tactics, both the Democrat 
and the Republican leaders seem to identify as the 
primary issue, not the peoples' demands for the 
fulfilment of minimum conditions for life, but the 
danger that their demands might undermine the 
profitability of U.S. transnational corporate 
investment. 
b. U.S. government and transnational corporate 
spokesmen emphasize the alleged 'strategic' importance 
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III. 
of both regions. They gloss over the fact that, not 
the 'natural assets' but U.S. investments have rendered 
the U.S. dependent on the two regions' resources. 
2. The US government adopted policies which more and 
more openly supported repressive regimes and 'contros' 
seeking to destabilize poular new governments. 
THE EVIDENCE: 
The remainder of this paper outlines evidence drawn from both 
regions to substantiate the above propositions. 
A. U.S. transnationals' investment and the changing 
international division of labor: 
1. The Caribbean Basin: 
In the late 19th Century, as internal U.S. frontiers 
disappeared, U.S. firms extended their investments into Central 
America. The Spanish-American war enabled the U.S. to take over 
Puerto Rico as a colony, and impose neo-colonial rule in Cuba. 
U.S. companies expanded plantation agriculture in the Central 
America's increasingly externally dependent 'banana 
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repub 1 i cs ~ 
As European (mainly British) colonial rule collapsed after 
World War II, US firms extended their activities into the 
Caribbean islands. However, they less frequently purchased real 
estate. Instead, they primarily invested in trade and finance, 
leaving local landowners to expand the cultivation of export 
crops. The U.S. companies maximized their profits through their 
control of international marketing networks and the processing 
of cotton -coffee-sugar-bananas-beef. Using modern refrigerated 
ships and world-wide telecommunications systems, US firms could 
shop around, not only in Latin America, but also in Africa and 
Asia to buy the lowest cost produce for their home factories. 
The local growers would bear the risks if production costs 
(including wages) rose, or world demand declined.y. 
In the late 1960s and 70s, US transnational banks took 
advantage of favorable tax concessions to establish Eurocurrency 
4. Jenny Pearce, Under the Eagle, U.S. Intervention in Central 
America and the Caribbean <Boston: South End Press, 1982) ch. 1. 
5. For details, see Tom Barry, Beth Wood, and Deb Preusch, The 
Other side of Paradise foreign control in the Caribbean, 
<Albuquerque, NM: The Resource Center, 1984> ch. 3. 
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finance platforms in the Cayman Islands, Barbados and the Bahamas 
~ From these, their influence spread over the 
financial institutions and trading networks of the 
region~ 
The banks extended credit to landholders to expand the 
cultivation of agricultural exports. Local oligarchs imported 
tractors and fertilizers to cultivate cotton and sugar. They 
spread their ranches over vast plains to grow beef for the 
markets of North America and Europe. These commercial ventures 
pushed peasants off lands they had tilled for centuries, growing 
food for themselves and their families. As Table 1 shows, 
although they increased agricultural output, more and more 
Caribbean countries became dependent on imported food. Some 
peasants stayed to work as seasonal plantation laborers. Many 
migrated to join the under- and unemployed crowded into city 
slums. 
platforms' consisted of offices through which 
of modern telecommuncations technologies --
on their foreign lending operations, thus 
Reserve Bank regulations and U.S. taxes. 
6. These 'finance 
-- taking advantage 
U.S. banks carried 
avoiding U.S. Federal 
7. Ibid, ch. 7. 
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of the growing pools of unemployed to hire workers for wages a 
fraction of those they paid in the U.S. They focused on 
countries where the governments provided especially attractive 
tax concessions and low labor costs: Puerto Rico; El Salvador; 
after the US invasion the Dominican Republic; and 
Haiti~ 
Subcontracting to local factories, medium and large US firms 
shifted the most labor-intensive phases of food processing 
automobile, semi-conductor, apparel, toy and other assembly 
industries to workshops in the Basin. Lowpaid, mostly female, 
laborers, sewed, pieced together and performed the other tedious 
assembly tasks to process imported semi-finished materials for 
re-export. The companies then shipped the goods back to the 
United States, paying duty only on the value added abroad -- a 
value guaranteed to be low because of the poverty-level wages 
paid Caribbean worker 9 
By the 1980s, subcontracted goods constituted three fourths 
of the manufactured exports to the US from Haiti, El Salvador, 
8. Ibid., ch. 4; see also Tom Barry, Beth Wood, and Deb Preusch, 
dollars & Dictators, a guide to Central America <Albuquerque, NM: 
1982> pp. 37 ff. 
9. Calculated in terms of the additional value of the imported 
product attributed to labor performed in the Caribbean factories. 
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As the decade of the 1980s opened, U.S. transnational 
corporations dominated the Caribbean Basin. In real terms, 
however, the region played only a marginal role in the economic 
life of the United States. By 1982, the book value of direct US 
investments in the Caribbean totalled $29 billion, a little more 
than 10 percent of all US investment abroad. US transnational 
banks and associated institutions held three fourths of that 
amount in finance-related investments offshore finance centers. 
Of the remainder, about $2 billion was in local banking, and $4 
billion in petroleum,mining, mnaufacturing, trade and services. 
Direct U.S. investments in Central America totalled about $$4.2 
billion more. US transnational corporations, including nearly 80 
of the 100 largest companies and the three largest banks in the 
US, owned shares in about 1,450 subsidiaries in Central America 
and over 1,700 in the Caribbean islands <excluding Puerto 
Rico) 
The United States imported sizeable shares of a few crude 
commodities from the region: bauxite <85%); bananas (69%>; sugar 
<17%); coffee <15%); and beef <15%). Nevertheless, even adding 
12. Barry et 
The authors 
value data 
investment; 
9. 
al, The Other Side of Paradise, op. cit., p. 157. 
note that these U.S. Department of Commerce book 
significantly understate the real value of U.S. 
and Barry et al, Dollars & Dictators, op. cit., p. 
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TABLE 2: SELECTED CARIBBEAN BASIN COUNTRY TRADE WITH THE UNITED 
STATES (in US$mi1lions; as a percent of the country's trade; 
and as a percent of U.S. trade in 1984> 
E:·:ports to u.s. Imports from u.s. 
country ($mi 1) (/. of (/. of ( $mi 1 . ) (/. of (/. of 
country us country us 
e:-:ports imports imports) e:-:ports> 
-------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ----- - - -
Costa Rica(a) 283 31.8 0.08 374 37.8 0.17 
Dominican 
Republic(a) 541 67.3 0.16 459 35.8 0.21 
E1 S<:H vader <a> 286 38.6 0.08 289 32.5 0.13 
Guatemala(a) 405 34.9 0.12 414 33.8 0.19 
Haiti <a> 319 76.1 0.09 402 63.5 0. 18 
Honduras 409 52.6 0. 12 354 42.7 0.16 
Jamaica 377 49.7 0.11 544 41.9 0.24 
Nicaragua(b) 62 14.2 0.02 122 16.7 0.05 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Note: <a> 1983 data; <b> By 1984, even before the 
final U.S. imposition of a full embargo, the hostile 
U.S. attitude and Nicaraguan fear of such a measure had 
led to a sharp decline in trade with the U.S. as 
Nicaragua diversified its trading partners. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of 
Trade Statistics 1985 ·(Wa.sb-LD.Q-ton. DC: I11F, 1985> 
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As Table 2 suggests, however, the Caribbean Bas 1· n countries 
depended far more heavily on the United States. 
2. Southern Africa: 
--------------------
After World War Ii, many of the same u.s. transnational 
corporations and banks coll~hnr~+Qrl +n ouM~M~ ~h-•- •-· _ . 
subcontracted manufactures together with raw materials, the US 
imported about 3.4% of its total purchases abroad from the 
Caribbean Basin. It exported to the region about 3.2% of all the 
goods it sold overseas .. 
As Table 2 suggests, however, the Caribbean Basin countries 
depended far more heavily on the United States. 
2. Southern Africa: 
After World War II, many of the same U.S. transnational 
corporations and banks collaborated to expand their investments 
in southern Africa, contributing to a development pattern several 
years behind, but remarkably similar to that of the Caribbean 
Basin. However, two underlying factors operated to differentiate 
consequences in southern Africa: First, outright European 
colonial rule (especially British, but also Portuguese> lasted 
longer in southern Africa, finally ending only with the 1980 
13. For details of trade, see United Nations, International Trade 
Statistics Yearbook, 1983 <New York: United Nations, 1985> vol . 
I, trade by country 
.- '~ -
.. 
liberation of Zimbabwe. This and the associated liberation 
struggles tended to limit U.S. corporate penetration. Second, 
U.S. and other transnational corporations focused their 
investments in South Africa which, with a third of the southern 
African population, emerged as a regional subcenter from which 
they sought to penetrate the neighboring countries. 
Outright colonial rule by the British and Portuguese 
bequeathed on most of southern Africa (only partially excepting 
South Africa), a lop-sided pattern of development not as 
advanced, but moving in the same direction as that 
of the Caribbean Basin states: So-called 'modern' enclaves 
geared to the export of crude mineral and agricultural materials; 
the import of manufactures, only marginally altered after World 
War II by the introduction of last-stage asembly and processing 
industries; and an institutional structure dominated by Europpean 
fi r ms which drained away a major share of their investable 
surpluses\)K' 
After World War II, U.S. investments in England provided a 
convenient channel to the ex-British colonies of Africa, 
especially South Africa. US transnafionals' purchase of shares 
14. E.g. see Ann Seidman, An Explanation of the Distorted Growth 
of Import Substitution Industry: the Zambian Case'', Journal of 
Modern African Studies, December, 1974. 
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in British companies sometimes gave them links to the 
'commanding heights' the banks, trading and mining firms --
of the newly independent southern African state¥- At the 
same time, fledgling southern African governments sought new 
sources of funds. Adopting conventional western wisdom, many 
took steps to provide inputs, marketi·ng facilities, credit c"'.:1d 
extension education to stimulate peasants to cultivate thei ; 
nations' best lands for export crops. They =old more and more of 
these to U.S. transnational corporat~ buyers which shopped around 
the third world looking for the cheapest sources of supply. 
However, the ~;eduction of food crops, mainly grown by women 
using outm~ded technologies on marginal lands, declined. 
Prolonged droughts like those of the mid-1970s and early '80s, 
devastated the less fertile, less-well watered food producing 
regions. South African destabilization tactics focused on food 
production, transport and storage~ 
As Table 3 shows, like the Caribbean nations, southern African 
15. For example, Chase Manhattan Bank acquired 15 percent of the 
shares of Standard Bank, whose affiliates dominated the domestic 
banking scene of South Africa and all of its neighbors when they 
attained independence; it divested itself of those shares to 
comply with U.S. laws when Standard sought to expand in the U.S., 
but maintained indirect ties <see A. Seidman and N. Makgetla, 
Outposts of Monopoly Capital - Southern Africa in the Changing 
Global Economy, Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill, 1980> 
16. E.g. See papers from Tufts University workshop an Food 
Security in Africa, March 14-16, 1986. 
-- 17 ·-
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states, formerly self-sufficient, began to import increasing 
amounts of food. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3: VALUE ADDED IN AGRICULTURE, CEREAL IMPORTS, AND CEREALS 
FOOD AID OF SEVERAL SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES, 1970-1983 
Country 
Angola 
Malawi 
Mozambique 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Value added 
in agriculture 
($mi 11 i ons<a>> 
1970 1983 
n.a. n.a. 
n. a. n.a. 
n.a. n. a. 
1583 1886 
444 562 
557 673 
Cereal imports 
( thoL1sands of 
metric tons> 
1974 1983 
149 287 
17 21 
62 287 
431 214 
93 247 
56 123 
Cereals food 
aid (thousands 
of metric tons> 
1974/5 1982/3 
0 60 
( . ) 3 
34 166 
148 171 
1 83 
0 6 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: <a> 1980 dollars; <b> Crop years. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, op. cit. 
Whatever their ideology, most African governments -- including 
- 18 -
those in southern Africa -- sought to attract new investments in 
mining and manufacturing. Given the colonial restrictions 
imposed on African entrepreneurial capacity, government-appointed 
directors of state corporations, using government capital, 
contracted with foreign 'partners' for marketing, managerial 
personnel and technologies. This contributed to the growth of 
what came to be known as the local 'bureaucratic' or 'managerial 
bourgeoisie ·v 
But US transnational corporate investors invested in the 
independent southern African states primarily to mine rich ores, 
drill for oil, or to buy low-cost coffee, tea, cotton, sugar, 
tobacco. Drawing in part on their Latin American experience, US 
transnationals seldom purchased land for agricultural 
development; they sought to stimulate local commercial farmers 
and peasants to expand their output of export crops. 
Incr-easingly, they encouraged the local governments to buy shares 
17. Issa G. Shivji, "Tanzania: The slilent class struggle" in 
Lionel Cliffe and John Saul, eds., Specialism in Tanzania: an 
interdisciplinary reader <II. Policies><Dar es Salaam: East 
Africa Publishing House, 1972>; and Richard Sklar, Corporate 
Power in an African State <Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1975>. 
18. E.g. American Metal Climax <AMAX> and the South African-based 
Anglo American Group welcomed the Zambia government's purchase of 
51 percent of the shares of the big mines that dominated Zambia's 
economy; and encouraged the Botswana government to purchase 
shares and provide the infrastructure for their nickel-copper 
mines there. 
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and help finance their mining ventures18 ~ They 
did little to foster basic industrial development in the independent 
African state 1~ 
In contrast, in close collaboration with local white settler 
capital in South Africa, US transnational corporations expanded 
their investments not only in mines, but also in manufacturing. 
In the late 19th and early 20th Century US financial interests 
first invested capital in South African mines, helping to lay the 
foundation for the settler-owned mining finance house ?Q A 
few large US companies, like General Electric, General Motors and 
ITT, invested in last stage-assembly and processing plants. 
After World War II, by holding down wages and social welfare 
expenditures for blacks, apartheid ensured exceptionally high 
profits for foreign investors. This, together with government 
tax and tariff incentives and a desire to gain access to the 
southern African market, attracted three fourths of all the 
19. The Zambian experience typified the results; see Seidman, ''An 
Explanation of the Distorted Growth of Import Substitution ••• •• op 
cit. 
20. Using foreign capital, and reinvesting their profits, the 
settler-colonialists built up a handful of South African-based 
investment groups called 'mining finance houses' that 
dominate South Africa's political economy. With capital from and 
ties to both English and American finance capital, the 
Anglo-American Group became the leading South African mining 
finance house dominating, not only South, but also much of 
southern Africa <See Duncan Innes, Anglo-American and the Rise of 
Modern South Africa. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984). 
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billion, about 20 percent of all direct foreign investments in 
South Africa, and surpassed only by those of Great Britain. 
U.S. financial institutions had outstanding loans to South 
African borrowers totalling $3.9 billion. U.S. investors held an 
estimated $8.1 billion worth of shares in South African business, 
mainly the mine~ 
Through South Africa, US companies seemed bent on acquiring a 
surrogate regional hegemony in southern Africa not dissimilar 
from that they enjoyed in the Caribbean Basin. Concentrated in 
South Africa, US investments in southern Africa totalled almost 
$20 billion, about three fifths that of the Caribbean Basin. 
From their South African regional headquarters, often in 
collaboration with South African mining finance houses, the 
transnationals invested in the neighboring countries' raw 
materials; and sold in their markets the manufactures produced in 
their South African factories or imported through South African 
ports from their home countries. Their expanding links with 
British and South African based banks and financial institutions 
enabled them to tap regionally-generated investable 
23. U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, Aug. 
1983; Board of Govenors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council, Statistical Release, 
E.l6 (26), June 1, 1983. 
24. Seidman and Makgetla, Outposts of Monopoly Capital, op. 
cit.; and Seidman, Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa, op. cit. 
22 
investments made by U.S. transnational manufacturing firms on the 
entire continent. From 1960 to 1976, U.S. investments in South 
Africa multiplied sixfold. In the five years following the 1976 
Soweto uprisings, they doubled agai 
In contrast to the independent southern African countries, 
Table 5 shows that South Africa's dependence on crude 
exports declined. Close examination reveals, however, 
that while South Africa exported mainly manufactured goods to its 
neighbors, it exported a much higher proportion of crude 
materials to the developed nations of Europe and north 
By 1983, total U.S. financial involvement in South Africa, 
including direct investment, bank loans, and stockholdings, had 
reached $14.6 billion. Direct U.S. investments totalled $2.6 
21. See U.S. Department of Commerce, " Foreign Investment" in the 
Current Survey of Business, for the relevant years. Some foreign 
manufacturing investments, including some from the U.S., spilled 
over into Zimbabwe when, before independence, it was still ruled 
by whites (3 percent of the population>, making Zimbabwe the 
second most industrialized country, not only in the region, but 
in all of subSaharan Africa. After independence, however, few 
U.S. firms heeded Zimbabwe's efforts to attract new manufacturing 
investments. Instead, the larger transnational corporate 
affiliates used U.S. government credit to finance the import of 
capital-intensive machinery and equipment, tending to put smaller 
local suppliers out of business. 
22. UN, International Trade Statistics, 1983, op. cit. 
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surpluse 
Through US transnational corporations' investments and trade, 
the US had become South Africa's leading trading partner, and US 
transnationals were expanding their trade and other activities 
in the neighboring countries. Although still not as important as 
for most Caribbean Basin countries, U.S. trade had become 
significant for several southern African states, particularly 
Angola and to a somewhat lesser extent, Zambia. As in the 
Caribbean, however, in all cases, southern African trade remained 
marginal to the U.S. economy, totalling only about one percent 
of total US trade 
TABLE 3: SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES' TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES 
(in US$millions; as a percent of their own trade; and as a 
25. U.S. supporters of 'Constructive Engagement' argue that South 
Africa (and Namibia) provides a major share of the world's 
strategic minerals, like chrome, manganese, platinum and 
uranium. In reality, the U.S. buys significant amounts of these 
minerals from South Africa because U.S. firms have invested in 
the mines there, rather than elsewhere, to take advantage of the 
near-slave labor conditions under apartheid. The U.S. has 
stockpiles of the strategic minerals, and could develop other 
sources over time. Furthermore, no matter what political 
economic option post-liberation South Africa or Namibia adopts, 
they will likely continue selling their minerals to the U.S. This 
is best illustrated by Angola's case. Despite the fact that the 
Angolan government has adopted a Mar>:ist-Leninist development 
path, and the U.S. administration has refused to recognize it and 
now seeks through well-publicized 'covert' means to overthrow it, 
its exports <primarily oil) to the United States constitute the 
largest dollar amount <excluding South Africa's) and a larger 
share of its exports than in the case of any southern African 
state. 
percent of U.S. trade, 1984) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Exports to u.s. Imports from u.s. 
Country ($mil.> ('/. of) ('/. of) ($mil.) ('/. of ('/. of 
country u.s. country u.s. 
exports imports imports) e:-:ports) 
-------- ------ ------ ------- ------ ------- -------
Angola 957 42.4 0.28 646 6.4 0.29 
Malawi 29 11.7 3 2.1 
Mozambique 24 12.8 25 4.6 
Tanzania 12 3.2 48 5.2 
Zambia 117 13.9 0.03 90 16.5 0.04 
Zimbabwe 68 8.6 0.02 64 8.3 0.02 
South African 
Customs 
Union< a> 1458 8.4 0.42 2375 13.2 1. 09 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: <a> Includes Nambia and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade 
Statistics, 1985 <Washington, DC: IMF, 1985) 
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B. Transnational corporate finance capital: 
-------------------------------------------
Many of the largest US trnsnationals holding investments in 
the Caribbean Basin multiplied their investments in South Africa. 
Furthermore, reflecting the importance of finance -- as opposed 
to industrial capital., most have representatives on 
the boards of directors of the two leading U.S. banks with a 
history of involvement in both regions: Citicorp, the largest 
bank, not only in the United States but-
•• 
nh n, th third ank. 
Further consolidating the links between transnational 
corporate interests in southern and especially South Africa and 
the Caribbean Basin, the Anglo American Group -- the largest 
South African mining finance house -- established an 'offshore' 
holding company in the Bahamas called MINORCA. Initially, Anglo 
American brought investable surpluses to this new venture from 
two southern African countries: Zambia, especially after the 
independent government bo~t 5~ 
)( 
i fndt.tstrial ancf banking capital. This 
evidence contradicts some Latin American theorists who claim 
modern imperialism is characterized by industrial conglomerates, 
fi l c i e R. Chilcote, Theories of 
and Und.,.develop 1 COa stvi w Pr•gs, 
'Z/ For details, see A. Seidman, ed., Natural Resources and 
National Welfare - The case of copper <Praeger Publishers, 1975) 
-zr- .... 
> • 
Notes: GT=greater than; LT=less than;*=company claims 
no equity ownership; company data pro-rated by 
ownership percentage. 
<•> 
inc• 
u. . centrate ts in 
in th ,.ic 
their operations into the neighboring countries, these 
data summarize their holdings in that country as an 
indicator of their southern African holdings. 
<b> Texaco and Standard Oil of California jointly own 
Caltex with reported assets of $234 million in South 
Africa/Namibia. 
<c> Cheesebrough-Pond's 
Chemical. 
was acquiring Stauffer 
Sources: For South Africa/Namibia, see Unified List 
of U.S. companies with Investments or Loans in South 
Africa or Namibia, coompiled by Pacific Northwest 
Research Center, Inc. <New York: American Committee on 
Africa, 1985>; and for Central America, see Tom barry, 
Beth Wood, Deb Preusch, Dollars & Dictators, A guide to 
Central America, <Albuquerque, N.M.: the Resource 
Center, 1982> 
L. 
' 
Table 4: Some leading U.S. Transnational Corporations with 
investments in both the Caribbean Basin and South 
Africa/Namibia, represented on the boards of directors of 
Citicorp or Chase Manhattan 
tar ~tral iCAI 
where have invest-
ments: 
--------------~------------------------
Transport 
Ford 
General Motors 
Oil 
Te:-:aco 
EH:-:on 
Electrical machinery, t e c. 
General Electric 
Chemicals 
Dow Chemical 
W.R. Grace & Co. 
Cheesebrough-Pond's 
Union Carbide 
Business machines 
BLtrroughs 
IBM 
1 
7 
6 
1 
~ 
·-· 
2 
1 
~ 
•.,.r 
1 
6 
y sectar<a». 
i 11 ions) 
-----------------------------
230 
140 
1 o. 0 
120.0 
32. () 
5.0 
14.0<c> 
54.0 
GT 150.0 
88.6 
-------------------------:--~~-:--------------------------
Table 6: EXPORT GROWTH, STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS, AND TERMS OF TRADE 
OF SELECTED CARIBBEAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1965 to 1983. 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Region/country Rate of Primary commods Terms of 
Growth as I. of e>:ports Trade 
I. (1982) ( 1980=1 00) 
65-73 73-83 1965 1982 1983 
------ -----
Caribbean Basin 
Costa Rica 10.3 2.7 84 72 95 
Dominican Rep. 11.0 2.2 98 83 85 
El Salvador 2.7 1.4 83 60 72 
Guatemala 5. 1 4.6 86 71 83 
Honduras 4.2 0.6 96 91 87 
Jamaica 3.9 -3.0 69 40 90 
Nicaragua 2.6 -0.4 94 92 67 
Panama 1.1 -6.6 n.a. 87 84 
Southern Africa 
Malawi 3.8 2.8 99 88 12 6 
Mozambique -7.9 -8.3 98 n.a 96 
South Africa<a> 1.6 5.6 68 26 71<b> 
Tanzania 0.9 -4.6 87 87 91 
Zambia 
-0.3 -0.8 100 n.a. 82 
Notes:<a> Data for South African Customs Union, including 
Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. <b> For 1981. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1985 <Washington, 
D.C.: he) 
---------------------------------=?~~~-------------------------
embargo on military exports to South Africa, the U.S. Space 
Research Company illegally shipped U.S. manufactured military 
weapons through Antigua to South Africa • Despite OPEC's attempt 
to block all oil flows to South Africa, both the Netherlands 
Antilles and Dominica served as transhipment points where tankers 
could load up with oil for South Africa • 
In the face of growing anti-apartheid sentiment directed at 
transnational banks like Citicorp that arranged billions in loans 
to South Africa, the Bahamas' offshore finance platforms provided 
a convenient location for laundering such financial transactions. 
C. Economic growth and mass poverty: 
From the 1950s through the early 1970s, both the Caribbean 
Basin and southern Africa experienced rapid, if uneven, growth 
geared primarily to expanding exports of agricultural produce and 
minerals. Instead of contributing to more integrated 
development capable of providing jobs and higher living 
standards, however, in both regions these externally dependent 
~ . Barry et al, The Other Side of Paradise, 1984, p. 258. 
1 Ibid., p. 233. Although South Africa has no oil depsoits, and 
U.S. firms obtain a considerable amount of crude from independent 
African states, Standard Oil, Texaco, Mobil and Shell BP helped 
build the largest refineries on the African continent in South 
Africa. 
1..i 
ther- ; and Zimbabwe wher-e, dur-ing the 15 year- UDI er-¥it e:-:panded 
its financial, tr-ade, industr-ial and agr-icultur-al holdings in 
almost ever-y sector- of the econom 
s, Anglo-Amer-ican 
Thr-oughout the late 1970s and '80 
ns 
expanded MINORCA's holdings, tying it mor-e closely to U.S. 
financial inter-ests. Walter- Wr-iston, then head of Citicor-p, 
joined MINORCA's dir-ector-s. Anglo Amer-ican became the second 
lar-gest for-eign investor- in the United States, with holdings in 
Phibr-o-Salomon, a major- U.S. financial institutio 
Scr-aps of evidence suggest these Car-ibbean ties helped the 
apartheid South Afr-ican r-egime to evade the inter-national 
(~1 / 
community's effor-ts to impose sanctions~ 
-
Violating the United Natio 
L The per-iod 
independence, 
·independence· 
gover-nment. 
dur-ing which, when Zambia and Malawi won 
the white settler- minor-ity declar-ed its 
fr-om Br-itain to pr-event black par-ticipation in the 
~ . Benson Zwizwai, unpublished paper 
r-oup's holdings in Zimbabwe, Har-ar-e: 
Univer-sity of Zimbabwe, 1982 
on the Anglo Amer-ican 
Economics Depar-tment, 
• See Duncan Innes, Anglo Amer-ican and the Rise of Moder-n South 
Afr-ica <New Yor-k: Monthly Review Pr-ess, 1984>; and the U.S. 
Secur-ities and Exchange Contr-ol SKlO r-epor-ts on Anglo Amer-ican 
Cor-poration and Phibr-o-Salomon. 
~- Although for- year-s the U.S. gover-nment maintained sanctions 
against Cuba, and in 1985 imposed them against Nicar-agua, it 
r-epeatedly vetoed effor-ts of the major-ity of UN member states to 
imose effective economic sanctions against South Afr-ica. the 
Reagan Administr-ation's 1985 par-tial sanctions against South 
Afr-ica fell far- shor-t of inflicting ser-ious constr-aints <see 
Seidman, The Roots of Cr-isis in Souther-n Afr-ica, op. cit. > 
-1§-
tiv.·ties aQQr-avated the char-acter-istic dualist featur-es of the 
n furth~ i ov ri•hed the a s s 
Although statistics showed initial 
gr-owth of individual countr-ies · national pr-oducts in both r-egions, the 
gr-eat 
major-ity of their- populations r-emained poor-. Widespr-ead 
illiter-acy pr-evailed. Untold number-s of childr-en 
suffer-ed, and many died fr-om malnutr-ition and pr-eventable 
diseases. A baby bor-n in souther-n Afr-ica or- any one of sever-al 
Car-ibbean nations could expect to live only two thir-ds as long as 
on• T ble ______ _ 
As tr-ansnational investments tied the economies of both 
r-egions mor-e closely into the capitalist wor-ld economy, class 
antagonisms emer-ged and consolidated. On the one hand, local 
capitalists, sometimes conflicting, but gener-ally collabor-ating 
with tr-ansnational cor-por-ations, acquir-ed new sour-ces of wealth, 
pr-ivilege and political power-
businessmen invested 
In the Car-ibbean Basin, landlor-ds and 
in and sat on local boar-ds of dir-ector-s of tr-ansnational-managed 
factor-ies and tr-ading fir-ms. In the minor-ity-r-uled souther-n 
Af r ican states, especially South Afr-ica and pr-e-independence 
Zimbabwe, white commer-cial far-mer-s pr-ofited fr-om similar- ties 
1 . Unless other-wise cited, for- the following details, see Pear-ce, 
Under- the Eagle, op. cit; Bar-r-y et al, Dollar-s and Dictator-s, 
op. cit; and The Other- Side of Par-adise, op. cit; and Seidman, 
The Roots of Cr-isis, op. cit. 
1.1 
------------------------------------------------------------
Table 7: 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES, 1981. 
AND LITERACY OF CARIBBEAN BASIN AND 
NATIONAL PRODUCTS, LIFE EXPECTANCY, POPULATION, GROSS 
-------------------------------------------------------------
GNP Life E:-:pect-
Liter-acy 
Car- ibbean Basin Population 
<US$m) ancy (year-s) (/. liter-ate> 
---------------
(millions> 
59 60 3.8 600 
r• 
Table 7: POPULATION, GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS, LIFE EXPECTANCY, 
AND LITERACY OF CARIBBEAN BASIN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES, 1981. 
Ca1~i bbean Basin Population GNP Life E:-:pect- Literacy 
----··----------- (millions) <US$m) ancy (years> (/. literate) 
ur•• 3.8 600 59 60 
E lv or 4.7 650 63 62 
~atemala 7.5 1,140 59 
Nicaragua 2.8 860 57 90 
Costa Rica ,.., -.L. •. .::. 1,430 73 90 
Panama 1.0 1,910 71 85 
Cuba 9.7 73 95 
Bahamas (>. 2 3,620 69 93 
Domincan Republic 5.6 1,260 62 67 
Haiti 5. 1 300 54 23 
Jamaica 2.2 1,180 71 90 
Grenada 0. 1 850 69 
St.Lucia 0.1 970 
Antigua/Barbuda 0. 1 1,550 
Barbados (). 3 3,500 71 99 
Dominica 0. 1 750 
Trinidad ~< Tobago 1. 2 5,670 72 95 
~ 3'2..-
transnational conglomerates press the U.S. government to pursue 
parallel policies in support of the status quo in both regions. 
In the Caribbean, U.S. transnationals, headed by David 
Rockefeller, formed a committee to back the Caribbean Basin 
In southern Africa, U.S. government spokespersons explicitly 
declared that U.S. transnationals played a crucial role in 
implementing Constructive Engagement. For this reason, they 
explained, the U.S. administration opposed divestment or 
sanctions against the intransigent South African minority regim ~t 
19 
The story of the Business Roundtable reveals only one channel 
through which U.S. transnationals seek to influence U.S. 
government policy. Many of the corporate executives 
participating in the Business Roundtable serve as directors of 
one or the other of the two giant U.S. banks, Citicorp and Chase 
Manhattan, that, over the years, have channelled major 
. Barry, et al, Dollars and Dictators, op. cit. 
E.g., Lawrence Eagleburger, undersecretary of state for 
polictical affairs before the National Conference of Editorial 
Writers, San Francisco, Ca, June 23, 1983; and U.S. ambassador to 
South Africa, Herman W. Nickol, "Constructive Engagement at 
Mil;i-TiiW " -AflH;rr- · c of Co oh nn 'Strurg, F 16, 
1 o~f i c..et s o me::mw '-'-''"1-' • ·. •- ~ ___ ';(_ . • . 
to do most of the organization's work. AT&T s ch1ef execut1ve 
officer in 1979, for example, employed three AT&T staff members 
on work related to the Roundtable task force which he chaired 
<See Green and Buchsbaum, op. cit. p. 72. For a more extended 
analysis of the Business Roundtable, see ibid. and Hager, op. 
cit.>. II 
South Africa-
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: 
Taking advantage of the technological revolution and the collapse o 
f European 
colonial rule after World War II, a handful of U.S. 
porations siezed the 
transnational cor 
opportunity to extend their domination over both the Caribbean Basin a 
nd southern 
Africa. They sought access to 
new low cost sources of raw materials and markets, as well as low 
cost labor for export industries. Learning from their earlier 
Central Amercian experience, they loaned funds to local private 
and government interests for investment in local processing, 
while maintaining control over finance, technology, management, 
and markets. They used a variety of channels 
to influence U.S. government policy to help maintain a 
'hospitable investment climate'. As the international economic 
crises of the '80s caused grwoing unemployment and falling living 
standards in the vulnerable externally dependent countries of 
both regions, nationalist movements mobilized to demand 
fundamental political economic reconstruction. Labelling these 
movements 'communist', the U.S. government pursued parallel 
policies to retain the hither-to profitable status quo. 
It matters little whether the U.S. policies reflected direct 
pressures ex.rted by the interlink•d U.S. tr nsnation•ls th•t 
II• 
do in tat ion•, uncriti c Al ad of the myth t h t 
sinister 'outside' elements sought to block U.S. corporate 
penetration. Viewed from the perspective of the peoples of both 
region s , the U.S. government marshalled its economic, political, 
and even military might in opposition to their efforts to end 
poverty and oppression. 
